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Abstract
We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equi-
librium in Marshall's theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of
the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890),
derive from the Strong Law of Demand. This is, existence, unique-
ness, optimality, global stability of equilibrium prices with respect to
tatonnement price adjustment and refutability follow from the cyclical
monotonicity of the market demand function in the Marshallian gen-
eral equilibrium model.
Keywords: Partial equilibrium analysis, short run equilibrium, strong
law of demand, cyclical monotonicity, Legendre-Fenchel duality
JEL Classication: B13, C62, D11, D51
1 Introduction
Marshall in NOTE XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of
Economics (1890) presents a fully articulated theory of general equilibrium
in market economies. His model dieres in several fundamental ways from
the general equilibrium model of Walras (1900). In Marshall's model there
are no explicit budget constraints for consumers, the marginal utilities of
incomes are exogenous constants and market prices are not normalized. He
\proves" the existence of market clearing prices, as does Walras, by counting
the number of equations and unknowns. Marshall's rst order conditions for
consumer satisfaction require the gradient of the consumer's utility function
We are pleased to thank Truman Bewley, Ben Polak and Mike Todd for their helpful
remarks..
1at the optimal consumption bundle to equal the vector of market prices,
unlike the Walrasian model where the rst order conditions for consumer
satisfaction require the normalized gradient of the consumer's utility func-
tion at the optimal consumption bundle to equal the normalized vector of
prices.
This is not the partial equilibrium model with only two goods usually
associated with Cournot (1838), Dupuit (1844) or Marshall (1890), nor is
is it the partial equilibrium model exposited in the rst chapter of Arrow
and Hahn (1971), or in chapter 10 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(1995)(MWG). A recent modern discussion of the fundamental properties of
Marhsall's general equilibrium model in NOTE XXI can be found in chapter
8 of Bewley (2007), where he calls it \short-run equilibrium". Consumers in
Bewley's model satisfy Marshall's rst order conditions in a short run equi-
librium. Bewley proves that: (i) a unique short-run equilibrium exists, (ii)
welfare in a short-run equilibrium can be computed using consumer surplus,
and (iii) the short-run equilibrium is globally stable under tatonnment price
adjustment.
For ease of exposition we limit most of our discussion to pure exchange
models but, as suggested by the analysis of Marshall's theory of value in
Bewley (2007), all of our results extend to Marshallian general equilibrium
models with production. We summarize the general case after our discussion
of pure exchange economies.
We prove that all properties shown in Bewley (2007) of Marshall's gen-
eral equilibrium model, are an immediate consequence of the market demand
function satisfying the Strong Law of Demand. In Brown and Calsamiglia
(2007) a demand function is said to satisfy the Strong Law of Demand
if it is a cyclically monotone function of prices. Cyclically monotone de-
mand functions do not only have downward sloping demand curves, in the
sense that they are monotone functions, but also their line integrals are
path-independent and measure the change in consumer's welfare in terms
of consumer's surplus for a given multidimensional change in market prices.
Following Quah (2000), we show that the Strong Law of Demand is preserved
under aggregation across consumers.
Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) prove that if a demand function satises
the Strong Law of Demand, then the consumer behaves as if he was max-
imizing a quasi-linear utility function subject to a budget constraint. The
assumption on quasi-linearity of utility functions is made by MWG in their
discussion of partial equilibrium analysis in the two good case, but there is
no explicit mention of quasi-linear utilities or the Strong Law od Demand
in Bewley's discussion of short-run equilibrium. Both Bewley and MWG
2partial and short-run equilibrium analysis derive from cyclical monotonicity
of the market demand function in Marshall's general equilibrium model.
Using the Legendre-Fenchel duality theory for smooth concave functions
presented in Rockafellar (1970), we oer a characterization of the Marshal-
lian general equilibrium model as a representative agent model. This de-
scription is due to Bewley (1980) and allows us to prove that Marshall's
theory of value is refutable. That is, there exists a nite family of multivari-
ate polynomial inequalities, the Afriat inequalities for quasi-linear utilities
derived by Brown and Calsamiglia (2007), where the parameters are the
market prices and aggregate demands and the unknowns are the utility lev-
els and marginal utilities of income of the representative consumer. They
show that these inequalities have a solution if and only if the nite data
set consisting of observations on market prices and associated aggreagate
demands is cyclically monotone- see Theorem 1 in Brown and Calsamiglia
(2007) and the rst chapter of Brown and Kubler (2007) for a general dis-
cussion of refutable theories of value.
2 The Strong Law of Demand
Hildenbrand's (1983) extension of the law of demand to multicommodity
market demand functions requires the demand function to be monotone. He
showed that it is monotone if the income distribution is price independent
and has downward sloping density. Subsequently, Quah (2000) extended
Hildenbrand's analysis to individual's demand functions. His sucient con-
dition for monotone individual demand is in terms of the income elasticity
of the marginal utility of income. Assuming that the commodity space is
Rn
++, we denote the demand function at prices p 2 Rn
++ by x(p). This de-
mand function satises the law of demand or is monotone if for any pair
p;p0 2 Rn
++ of prices





This means, in particular, that the demand curve of any good is down-
ward sloping with respect to its own price, i.e., satises the law of demand
if all other prices are held constant.
In an unrelated exercise, Rockafellar (1970) introduced the notion of
cyclical monotonicity as a means for characterizing the subgradient cor-
respondance of a convex function. For smooth strictly convex functions
f the gradient map @f(x) is cylically monotone if for all nite sequences
3fpt;xtgT
t=1, where pt = @f(xt):
x1  (p2   p1) + x2  (p3   p2) +  + xT  (p1   pT)  0:
3 Marshall's General Equilibrium Model






gi(xi)   p  xi
where gi is a smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave utility func-
tion on Rn
++, i is the exogenous marginal utility of income, p is the vector
of market prices and xi is the consumption bundle. In this model there are
no budget constraints and prices are not normalized. For a discussion of
these assumptions in the context of rational expectations and Friedman's
permanent income hypothesis, see chapter 8 in Bewley (2007). This spec-
ication of the consumer's optimization problem rationalizes the family of
equations dening Marshall's general equilibrium model (absent production)
in his NOTE XXI.
Let x(p) be the solution to (M). (M) need not have a solution for all
p 2 Rn
++, but as noted in Bewley (1980) the set of p such that (M) has
a solution is nonempty, open and convex. Given his assumptions on g, it
follows from Hadamard's Theorem | see Gordon (1972) for a discussion
and proof of Hadamard's Theorem | that (M) has a solution for all p 2
Rn
++ if and only if the gradient map, i.e., x ! @g(x), is a proper map.
Recall that a continuous map ` : V ! W is proper if for every compact
subset K  W;` 1(K) is a compact subset of V . In Marshall's specication
of individual's utilities, where consumers have smooth additively separable
utility functions, the marginal utility of consumption of each good goes to
innity as consumption goes to zero and the marginal utility of consumption
of each good goes to zero as consumption goes to innity, hence the gradient
map is proper (e.g., g(x) = lnx has a proper gradient map, but g(x) =
x   e x does not). Marshall's demand functions are dened on all of Rn
++.
Bewley (1980) is therefore a generalization of Marshall, where Bewley drops
Marshall's assumptions of separability of the utility function and properness
of the gradient map. As in Marshall, we assume that x ! @g(x) is a proper
map, but we do not assume that utility functions are additively separable. In
this case there is an equivalent formulation of (M) as a Walrasian consumer
optimization problem, where the consumer maximizes a quasi-linear utility
4function subject to her budget constraint- see Brown and Calsamiglia (2007).
Theorem 1 If there are I consumers, where each consumer i's optimiza-
tion problem is given by (M), then the market demand function satises the
Strong Law of Demand.
Proof: Let hi(p) = 1
igi(xi(p))   p  xi(p) be the optimal value function
for (M) for consumer i. Applying the envelope theorem we know that
@hi(p) =  xi(p).1 Let H(p) =
PI
i=1 hi(p), then @H(p) =
PI
i=1 @hi(p) = PI





i=1 @hi(p) =  @H(p).2 Since hi(p) is a convex function, hi(p) is con-
cave and  H(p) is also concave. Hence, the market demand function satises
the Strong Law of Demand because the gradient map of a concave function
is cyclically monotone{see Theorem 24.8 in Rockafellar (1970).
2
Corollary 1 The Marshallian general equilibrium model has a unique equi-
librium price vector that is globally stable under tatonnment price adjust-
ment.
Proof: Every cyclically monotone map is a monotone map. That is, market
demand functions satisfying the Strong Law of Demand a fortiori satisfy the
Law of Demand. Hildenbrand (1983) shows that economies satisfying the
Law of Demand have a unique equilibrium price vectors that are globally
stable under tatonnment price adjustment.
2
Corollary 2 Welfare in the Marshallian general equilibrium model can be
computed using consumer surplus.
Proof: Brown and Brown (2007) show that this property of cyclically mono-
tone demand functions.
2
1Convex analysis has a rich theory of duality, described by Rockafellar's (1970), based
on the Legendre{Fenchel transform of a concave function g(x), denoted g
(p), called the
conjugate of g(x) : g
(p) = infx2Rn
++ fp  x   g(x)g. Hence g
(p) =  h(p) and h is an ex-
tended real-valued function. The conjugate (or surplus function in Bewley's terminology)
plays the same role in analysis of the Marshallian consumer optimization model as the
indirect utility function does in the Walrasian model of consumer choice.
2Theorem 16.4 in Rockafellar (1970) shows that the operations of addition and inmal
convolution of proper convex functions are dual to eachother.
53.1 Marshallian Representative Consumer
To prove that the Marshallian general equilibrium model is refutable, we
will rst show that it can be described as a representative agent model, as
originally suggested by Bewley (1980).
The representative agent's utility function in Bewley's Marshallian model















Bewley shows that ( p;x( p)) is an equilibrium of the exchange econ-
omy with consumers f(gi;i)gI
i=1 and endowment  e if and only if  e =
argmaxfW(e)  peg. Equivalently, for a given  e, the price vector  p such that
 e = argmaxfW(e)    peg will be the unique competitive equilibrium price
vector for this exchange economy. Let H( p) = maxe2Rn
++fW(e)    p  eg,
then it follows from this result that H( p) 
PT
t=1 ht( p) if  p is a competi-
tive equilibrium vector of prices. Hence  (@H=@p)j p =
PT
t=1  (@ht=@p)j p = PT
t=1 xt( p) = x( p) =  e: The equilibrium map p(e) is again the inverse of the
demand function of the representative consumer. From Rockafellar (1970),
Corollary 23.5.1, p. 219 we know that if g is a continuous concave function
on Rn
++ then p 2 @g(x) if and only if x 2 @   h(p). It follows from this du-
ality relationship that  p is the unique equilibrium price vector for the social
endowment  e if and only if  p = (@W=@e)je= e and  (@H=@p)j p =  e. Given a
nite set of observations on social endowments and market clearing prices,
we can now characterize the testable implications of Marshall's theory of
value. A given data set rationalizes Marshall's general equilibrium model if
and only if it is cyclically monotone.
Theorem 2 The equilibrium map, p(e), in Marshall's general equilibrium
model is cyclically monotone in e, the social endowment.
Proof: Because gi is strictly concave, W is strictly concave as well. By
Theorem 24.8 in Rockafellar (1970) we know that the gradient map of a
concave function is cyclically monotone, which implies that the gradient
map  e ! (@W
@e )je= e =  p is cyclically monotone.
2
6All of our results: existence, uniqueness, optimality, tatonnment stability
and refutability extend to the Marshallian general equilibrium model with
production. Optimality, tatonnment stability and refutability follow from
the well-known duality result in convex analysis that the supply function is
the gradient of the prot function or conjugate of the cost function. As such,
the supply function is also cyclically monotone .The cyclical monotonicity
of aggregate supply and aggregate demand guarantee (i) that producer and
consumer surplus are well dened, (ii) that the excess demand function is
cyclically monotone and (iii) that the aggregate demand function and the
aggregate supply function are refutable .As in Bewley (2007), existence is
shown by maximizing the representative agent `s utility function over the
compact set of feasible production plans .If this set is strictly convex then
the optimum is unique and the supporting prices are the equilibrium prices
.See Bewley`s chapter on short-run equilibria for detailed proofs of existence
,uniqueness ,optimality and tatonnment stability .Refutability follows from
Brown and Calsamiglia (2007).
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